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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of introducing a Research Evaluation Exercise
(REE) on Italian undergraduate students’ enrolment choices. We investigate whether
subject-groups in higher education institutions (HEIs) that performed better in the
REE also benefited from more student enrolments and the enrolment of students with
better entry qualifications. To this aim, we use a before-after estimator that exploits
differential treatment intensities across HEIs and subject groups. Our analysis demon-
strates that the REE had a positive effect on student enrolment, but only in the
top-performing HEIs. The effect was larger for high-quality students, namely those
with better high school final marks or coming from the academic track. Further ex-
ploratory analysis suggests that there was a reversal in the effect with the second REE,
with only medium- or bottom-performing HEIs gaining more enrolments as a result of
improving their performance.
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1 Introduction
Several scholars, particularly in the USA, have investigated the effects of ratings and rank-
ings of higher education institutions (HEIs hereafter) produced by private intermediaries
(e.g. the US News & World Report College Rankings) on student applications and matric-
ulation decisions. These studies have found that the improvement of institutional rankings
has a positive effect on student applications (see the literature review in Tutterow and
Evans, 2016), however, the size of the effect is not very large and is generally smaller in
studies using time-series that control for prior rank (Sauder and Lancaster, 2006). The
effect of rankings on the number of applications and matriculations is greater for top insti-
tutions (Bowman and Bastedo, 2009), and the way information is presented also matters.
A better performance in the league tables is more effective at increasing applications when
HEIs are listed by rank rather than in alphabetical order, although this effect is smaller
for top institutions, which already have well-established reputations (Luca and Jonathan,
2013). A higher rank is also associated with greater selectivity in admissions, lower ac-
ceptance rates (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999; Meredith, 2004) and higher student quality
(Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999; Griffith and Rask, 2007).1 Evidence also exists for the UK,
where researchers have assessed the responsiveness of applications to the rankings produced
by popular newspapers such as The Guardian or The Times. The results are aligned with
the US literature. Papers that pool all subjects and analyse the effect of ranking on ap-
plications at the university level rather than at the subject-group (i.e. study-field) level
generally find smaller effects (Soo, 2013; Broecke, 2015). This is partly because the quality
of subject groups varies considerably within an institution (Chevalier and Jia, 2016; Gib-
bons et al., 2015). Interestingly, UK studies also confirm that the salience of information
matters. Information on student satisfaction affects applications only when it is incorpo-
rated in league tables, and ranking scores are more relevant when there is a high level of
competition among departments and institutions (Gibbons et al., 2015).
Despite abundant evidence on the effects of league tables, none of the studies just men-
tioned have looked into the effect of “official” rankings, e.g. those produced by government-
run Research Evaluation Exercises (REEs), on student choices. On this issue, the evidence
is (to the best of our knowledge) almost non-existent. However, given the amount of
money often involved in these evaluations, it is important to investigate their effects on
stakeholders such as students and their families. We are only aware of two papers inves-
tigating the effects of REEs on student choices, both of which provide evidence on the
Excellence Initiative run by the German government in 2006 and 2007. This nationwide
competition awarded extra funding to the universities with the best future concept for re-
1 However, Meredith (2004) does not find an effect on the SAT score of applicants.
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search. In the first study, using administrative data on student applications, Horstschra¨er
(2012) demonstrates that medical schools in universities that were awarded a status of
excellence experienced a significant increase in their number of applications. In the second
study, Fischer and Kampko¨tter (2017) used survey data to show that winning the competi-
tion allowed universities to enrol high-school graduates of a significantly higher calibre (in
terms of GPA) in three subsequent admission terms. The label of “Excellence University”
improved students’ ratings of a university’s educational quality and their labour market
expectations immediately after the award. However, these expectations quickly returned
to the baseline level after three years, despite the persistence of the universities’ status of
excellence.
The evaluation of the research conducted in 2001-2003, (Valutazione Triennale della
Ricerca 2001-2003, VTR hereafter), which was completed in 2006 and the results of which
were made public that same year, represented the first adoption of an official REE in Italy.
Like subsequent REEs,2 it attracted considerable attention from researchers (Rebora and
Turri, 2013; Geuna and Piolatto, 2016). However, following a well-established stream of
research (see, among others, Jime´nez-Contreras et al., 2003; Auranen and Nieminen, 2010),
only the effect of the VTR on the supply side of higher education, namely on universities’
research productivity, has been assessed (Cattaneo et al., 2016).
Surprisingly, and to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies of the effect of the
VTR on the demand side, i.e. on students. In the current paper, we aim to fill this gap
by investigating whether the results obtained in the REE had any consequences for Italian
HEIs in terms of the number and quality of enrolled students.3 Two major differences
between the Italian VTR and the German Excellence Initiative, which has been already
investigated in the literature, are (i) the absence of an overall university ranking in the
latter (a status of excellence was awarded to the universities that won the competition,
without the possibility of differentiating between non-winning HEIs in terms of quality),
which makes it different from REEs; (ii) excellence status was awarded to universities and
2 The results of the second REE, covering scientific production in the period 2004-2010, (Valutazione
della Qualita` della Ricerca, VQR 2004-2010), were publicly released in 2013, and those of the third REE
(VQR 2011-2014) in 2017.
3 The results of the VTR have already been used in some individual-level studies of Italian students’
geographical mobility and labour market outcomes. Ciriaci (2014), using cross-section data, reports that
the probability of a student graduating from a university outside his or her region of residence increases
with the VTR score of the university of destination and decreases as the average score of the universities
in their region of residence increases. We add to that paper by providing evidence from panel data, which
allows us to deal with university time-invariant or very persistent unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. university
reputation) and by providing evidence on student enrolment instead of graduation. Sylos Labini and
Zinovyeva (2011) demonstrates that research quality, measured by the VTR score, raises the probability
that an individual enrols in a PhD course.
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not to HEI subject groups.
Italy is an interesting case study. Italy has always been characterised by the so-called
legal value of university degrees. This grants formal equality among all degrees irrespective
of the awarding institution (e.g. in access to public sector jobs). However, a progressive
reduction in public funding for universities,4 together with a decrease in student numbers,5
has spurred increasing competition among HEIs, creating a quasi-market for education
(on the concept of the quasi-market see, for instance, Niklasson, 1996). In the absence
of an official quality assessment of HEIs, students had little guidance when selecting an
institution at which to enrol. Popular newspapers such as La Repubblica or Il Sole 24 Ore
have exploited this lack of information by producing specialised publications containing
HEI league tables. On the one hand, in this context, the implementation of an official
REE by the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (Ministero dell’Istruzione,
dell’Universit e della Ricerca, MIUR) is likely to have made a reliable source of information
available to students and may have had an impact on their choices. On the other hand, as
the object of the evaluation was only research, it is not at all obvious that such information
was deemed relevant by students when choosing HEIs. The main goal of this paper is to
assess whether or not this was the case.
We provide a first assessment of the impact of the VTR on student choices using a
before-after estimator that exploits differential treatment intensities across HEIs. The
score obtained in the VTR is the “dose” of the treatment administered to HEIs. In our
analysis, we compare HEI outcomes (total enrolments and student quality) before and after
the VTR, and look at whether there were significant changes associated with the results
obtained in the VTR. The main identification assumption is that there are no omitted
contextual variables that may be responsible for these changes. Such unobservable factors
must have two features in order to threaten our identification strategy: (1) they must have
the same timing as the release of the VTR results; and (2) they must be correlated with
the VTR outcomes. This makes clear the importance of exploiting differences in VTR
outcomes (i.e. treatment intensities) between HEIs and subject groups for identification
purposes. When making a simple before-after comparison, i.e. simply comparing outcomes
between the pre- and post-VTR periods, the effect of the VTR may be confounded, for
instance, with that of the recession that began in 2008 or with other reforms that were
introduced in 2006 (e.g. the extending of compulsory schooling to age 16, mandated by
Law no. 296 of 27 December 2006, or the change in the composition of the members of the
4 The Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario (FFO), which is the main source of public funding for Italian
HEIs, decreased from almost 7.5 billion euros in 2009 to less than 6.4 billion euros in 2015.
5 The total number of students enrolled decreased from a peak of 338,000 in the 2003/2004 academic
year (following the “Bologna reform” of 2001) to 255,000 in 2014/2015.
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evaluation committee of the upper secondary school final exam, mandated by Law no. 1 of
11 January 2007). By also exploiting differences in treatment intensities across HEIs and
scientific areas for identification purposes, we are able to control for year-specific or even
province-year-specific fixed effects, absorbing inter-alia, the impact of the recession and of
other reforms that impacted all HEIs similarly. Our identification strategy also enables us
to control for time-invariant subject group by HEI heterogeneity (through subject-group
HEI fixed effects), which may simultaneously affect the VTR results and the number of
enrolments. In some specifications, we also control for subject-group-HEI trends, which
might pre-date the implementation of the VTR.
This paper contributes to the extant literature in at least two ways. First, as previously
mentioned, our study is the first to systematically examine the effect of an official REE
on student decisions. Unlike the previous literature on privately produced league tables,
we compare a period in which an official REE was not in place with a period in which
an REE was implemented. Thus, unlike the extant research, our paper is not concerned
with the effects of increasing HEI rankings but rather, with how HEI enrolments changed
over time as a consequence of having performed well (or badly) in the first REE. In this
sense, our estimates can be roughly interpreted as the effect of establishing an REE on
student enrolment decisions. This is of interest not only to stakeholders in Italy, but also
to readers and policy makers in countries that are considering implementing similar REEs.
Second, in line with the most recent literature (Chevalier and Jia, 2016; Gibbons et al.,
2015), we frame the analysis at the level of subject groups within HEIs. This is important
because, similar to newspaper league table rankings, REE rankings are also very likely to
differ across disciplines. We show that this is the case for the VTR evaluation exercise,
in which there were often considerable differences in the scores of subject groups in the
same university.6 Thus, aggregating the analysis at the HEI level is likely to wash out
most of the variation across subject groups and hide the true effect of the research quality
assessment on student choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the context in which the first Italian
REE was introduced, as well as its main characteristics. In Section 3, we explain our
empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical analysis, the results of
which are commented on in Section 5. A brief discussion of the main mechanisms through
which the VTR could have affected student choices is presented in Section 6. Section
7 reports exploratory analyses for a more recent REE and for other student outcomes.
Finally, Section 8 summarises the main findings and offers some concluding remarks.
6 It is important to note here that within the same alma mater, researchers in different subject groups
can be affiliated with the same department, and researchers in the same subject groups can be affiliated to
different departments.
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2 The Italian higher education system and the first Research
Evaluation Exercise
2.1 Institutional setup
The Italian higher education system has always been characterised by a high degree of
centralisation. Law no. 382 of 11 July 1980 provided that any changes to the existing
university supply had to be included in a development plan to be approved by the Minister
of Education every three years. Moreover, the opening of new universities required a specific
law to be passed by Parliament. University degrees had to meet criteria fixed centrally by
the Ministry of Education, concerning, among other things, the curriculum content. The
fact that the system was (and still is) almost entirely public and directly managed by the
central government, together with the similarity of the degrees supplied by different HEIs,
led to the legal recognition of degrees in the same field as identical (valore legale, legal
value).
On the demand side, until a few decades ago, the student body used to come almost
exclusively from families in relatively high socio-economic brackets. Indeed, intergenera-
tional mobility in education has historically been lower in Italy than in other developed
countries. For example, Checchi et al. (1999) report that less than 2% of people whose
fathers did not complete compulsory schooling end up having a college degree in Italy,
while the corresponding figure for the USA is 12%. The evolution from an elite to a mass
university system began in 1969, when access to university was liberalised and enrolment in
any field became possible for students holding all types of upper secondary school degrees
(Law no. 910 of 11 December 1969).7
On the supply side, the increased demand for higher education led to the foundation
of many new HEIs, faculties and local branches. Reforms between the late 1980s and the
early 1990s granted an unprecedented level of autonomy to universities regarding the man-
agement of teaching and financial resources. The requirement for parliamentary approval
was abandoned in 1990 (Law no. 341 of 19 December 1990), although the requirement
of inclusion in a university development plan was retained. However, universities gained
the autonomy to advance proposals for new initiatives to the Ministry. Many institutions
used this new autonomy to open branches in smaller cities and to increase the number of
degrees offered (Bratti et al., 2008; Oppedisano, 2011).
A major step towards a mass tertiary education system was taken with the completion
of the Bologna Process and the so-called “3+2” reform (Ministerial Decree no. 509/99).8
7 Before this law, only individuals graduating from a specific upper secondary school academic track
(liceo classico, i.e. classical lyceum) could enrol in all types of tertiary education.
8 For a brief description of the “3+2” university reform, see Di Pietro and Cutillo (2008) and Cappellari
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The old, long (mostly four- or five-year) degrees were replaced with two levels of degrees:
three-year first-level degrees and two-year second-level degrees.9 The large increase in the
supply of degrees offered made it difficult for high school graduates to choose the best
possible option according to their preferences and constraints. This made prospective
students increasingly interested in knowing the relative quality of institutions and degrees.
Also for this reason, about 15 years ago, two of the main Italian newspapers (Il Sole 24 Ore
and La Repubblica) began publishing yearly rankings of Italian universities and faculties.10
2.2 The first Research Evaluation Exercise
With the purpose of evaluating the quality of universities and other research institutions
receiving public funds and to diffuse this information among stakeholders, the Steering
Committee for Research Evaluation (Comitato di Indirizzo per la Valutazione della Ricerca,
CIVR) initiated the first REE (i.e. the VTR) in December 2003. The REE assessed the
research produced by 102 Italian institutions (77 universities and 25 research agencies)
for the period 2001-2003. The products evaluated were divided into 20 disciplinary areas:
the 14 National University Council (Consiglio Universitario Nazionale, CUN) areas plus 6
interdisciplinary sectors.11 Each university was required to send one product (of its own
choosing) per every four researchers, while research agencies were required to submit one
product per every two researchers. The first REE was entirely based on a peer review
process. A total of 17,329 products were evaluated by 6,661 experts (Franceschet and
Costantini, 2011). Each product evaluation, conducted by at least two referees, led to four
possible outcomes: excellent, good, passable and of limited value. Furthermore, universities
shared data on human resources, international mobility and research funding, in order for
the assessment to be as complete and informed as possible. The total cost of the REE was
around 3.55 million euros. Initially, only very limited funding was linked to the results of
the REE (see, for details Rebora and Turri, 2013).
The final results of the evaluation were released in February 2006, potentially affecting
university enrolments beginning in the 2006-2007 academic year. The final VTR ranking
score was built as a weighted average, with the number of “excellent” (E) products multi-
plied by 1, “good” (G) products by 0.8, “passable” (P) products by 0.6 and “limited value”
and Lucifora (2009).
9 Other courses were also introduced, such as first-level masters degrees and second-level masters degrees,
but most students enrolled in the first two types of degrees.
10 Faculties are the equivalent of schools in the international context.
11 The CUN’s members are elected to advise MIUR on matters related to HEIs.
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(L) products by 0.2. The formula is:
final VTR score =
1 · E + 0.8 ·G+ 0.6 · P + 0.2 · L
total products evaluated
. (1)
This indicator can vary between 0.2 (if all products are judged as of “limited value”) and
1 (if all products are “excellent”). For the purposes of the current study, we use two main
indicators of quality. The first is the final VTR score, computed as described above, and
the second is the percentage of excellent products (i.e. those evaluated as “excellent”). To
make the results of the estimated regressions easier to read, both indicators are included
in the econometric models as standardised variables with zero mean and unit standard
deviation (σ hereafter), so that their coefficients correspond to the percentage increase (as
the dependent variable is measured as a logarithm) in the dependent variable produced by
a 1σ increase in the indicator.12
3 Empirical strategy
We are primarily interested in the impact of the VTR on the number of university enrol-
ments and the quality of students. We use two measures of student quality. The first is
the number of students coming from the upper secondary school academic track (liceo),
and the second is the number of students with grades above 90 in the upper secondary
school final examination (grades range from 60 to 100).13 We use data on enrolments from
2002 to 2011, that is, before the second and third REEs began. We base our identification
strategy on a before-after estimator with differential treatment intensities.14 The main
idea is to look at whether subject-group HEIs (e.g. Economics at the University of Milan)
that performed well in the evaluation exercise attracted a larger number of students and a
higher calibre of students after the VTR than they did in the past, as compared to subject-
group HEIs that did not perform satisfactorily in the research assessment. Our empirical
specification is described by the following equation:
12 The final VTR score for research quality has been used by MIUR to build official rankings of universities
in each of the 20 disciplinary areas. Here, we focus on the VTR score and not on the official rankings,
as the latter were produced based on university size (large, medium, small). Such a classification is not
particularly useful for students who are interested in enrolling in high-quality HEIs, although it may be
important for the Ministry, which has to allocate public resources.
13 Italy has a tracked upper secondary school system. Schools can be divided into three main tracks. The
first is represented by the academic track, and we will refer to these schools as the academic high schools.
The second is the technical track and the third, the vocational track. Students who choose the academic
track generally go on to tertiary education.
14 Since all HEIs were subject to the VTR exactly at the same time, it is not possible to use a difference-
in-differences (DID) strategy (see, for instance, Duflo, 2001).
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lnYijt = α0 +
∑
i
α1iDi +
∑
j
∑
t
α2jtDjt + α3(V TRi · POST2005) + ijt (2)
where i, j and t are subject-group HEI, province and year subscripts, respectively.
Yijt is the number of students enrolled in natural logarithm form. Di is an indicator
variable defined at the subject-group HEI level; Djt are province-year fixed effects;
15 V TRi
a (time-invariant) continuous variable reflecting performance in the VTR and POST2005
is a dummy that takes a value of zero before VTR and 1 after. Specifically, the first
academic year affected by the reform was 2006/2007, and starting from this academic
year, the POST2005 indicator takes a value of 1. ijt is an error term. In this baseline
specification, α3 captures a higher or lower level of the outcome variable (e.g. student
enrolments or student quality) after 2005 for subject-group HEIs that performed better in
the VTR. Subject-group HEI time-invariant factors (e.g. university prestige) are captured
by α1i and local factors (e.g. cost of housing, local unemployment, local availability of
student residences or scholarships) by α2jt.
16
The specification in equation (2) controls for subject-group-HEI fixed effects, i.e. subject-
group HEIs are allowed to start from different intercepts as far as enrolments and student
quality are concerned. These fixed effects control for time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity that might affect the number of enrolments and student quality (e.g. reputation).
However, we also estimate a more demanding specification including both subject-group
HEI-specific intercepts and subject-group HEI-specific trends, which allow subject-group
HEIs to follow different pre-VTR trends in the outcome variables. This may address the
concern that subject-group HEIs that saw an increase in enrolment or in student qual-
ity after the VTR may have already been on a steeper upward trend before the research
assessment. The corresponding specification is:
lnYijt = α0+
∑
i
α1iDi+
∑
i
γi(Di ·t)+
∑
j
∑
t
α2jtDjt+α3(V TRi ·POST2005)+ijt (3)
where the γis are the coefficients of the subject-group HEI-specific linear trends Di · t.
15 In Italy, a province (provincia) is an administrative division of intermediate level between a municipality
(comune) and a region (regione). Provinces correspond to Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
3 (NUTS-3) in Eurostat’s classification. Although this is our preferred specification, we also report results
including separate province and year fixed effects.
16 The inclusion of subject-group-HEI and province-year fixed effects implies that the effect of the VTR
cannot be identified when a HEI provides courses only in one subject-group in a given province and is the
only HEI present in that province. In the dataset, only 49 observations satisfy both of these conditions.
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4 Data
Our analysis is based on data from two main sources. Information about the number of
students first enrolled in each year and degree course (including a code on the detailed
field of study) comes from an old version of the MIUR Statistical Office’s website (http:
//statistica.miur.it).17 This dataset also includes the number of enrolled students by
upper secondary school final grade and track. We focus our analysis on students enrolled
in first-level (i.e. undergraduate) degrees. This choice is dictated by the fact that second-
level degrees were introduced by universities in the 2004/2005 academic year, meaning
there are not enough years before 2006 to estimate the effect of the VTR on student
enrolment in these degrees.18 Student enrolment data for each first-level degree course
were aggregated in HEI-province-subject group-year cells, where HEI-province cells define
university branches (Italian universities often have branches located in different provinces).
The second data source is a report released by the Steering Committee for Research
Evaluation in February 2006. The document contains information on research quality
for 77 universities, divided by academic area. We decided to focus our attention on two
measures of research quality, the final VTR score and the percentage of excellent products.
Before running the analysis, the two sources of data had to be merged. In the Ital-
ian higher education system, first-level and second-level degrees are classified into “degree
classes” (classi di laurea), i.e. groups that have similar training objectives and a mini-
mum number of credits in given — narrowly defined — subject groups. The latter are
defined in terms of scientific sectors (settori scientifico-disciplinari). Scientific sectors are
subject groups in which academic personnel are placed for career purposes. For instance,
researchers can participate in public hiring or promotion competitions only in their (or a
17 Unfortunately, this website has been taken oﬄine, and data from before 2014 are no longer available.
Data on recent academic years are publicly available on the new website http://ustat.miur.it/. All data
used in this paper are available upon request.
18 There are other reasons why it might be preferable to focus on first-level degrees. First of all, while
many second-level degrees had a fixed number of slots per year, the same was not true for first-level degrees,
where access was unconstrained almost everywhere in Italy in the period under consideration. As we are
interested in the effect of research quality on student enrolment, restrictions on the number of slots (for
which we do not have data) would be a potential confounding factor in our analysis. We expect that HEIs
with a higher score in the REE would tend to rely more on selective admissions for second-level degrees,
leading to a potential negative bias in our estimates of the effect on total enrolments. Secondly, the two
indicators for the quality of enrolled students used here are likely to be better proxies of student quality
prior to starting first-level degrees, whereas for second-level degrees, the final grades of first-level degrees
are a better proxy of student ability. Unfortunately, data on the latter are not available. Third, in the first
period of implementation, the curricula of second-level degrees were designed to be a natural continuation
of the first-level degrees provided by the same institution, and there was little mobility of students across
HEIs.
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very similar, i.e. “affine”) scientific sector.19 Moreover, a course belonging to a given sci-
entific sector can generally be taught only by academic staff (assistant professors, associate
professors or full professors) belonging to the same or to an “affine” sector.
To carry out our analysis, we have to map the results of the VTR, which are available
at the level of scientific sector, with student enrolments, which are available at the “degree
class” level. We proceed as follows: (1) VTR results are aggregated into broad academic
areas according to the National University Council’s classification; (2) “degree classes”
are aggregated into broad subject groups according to scientific sector; (3) the two sets of
subject groups are matched lexicographically. The linking table is reported in Appendix A.
We obtained complete information about enrolment and research quality for 518 subject-
group HEI groups. We deem this match, which maps the prevailing content of a group of
degrees onto the research performance of academic staff in that same subject group, to be
sufficiently precise for our purposes.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 2 about here
In Figure 1, we plot the variation in final VTR score between and within institutions.
The graph presents the lowest, average and highest scores obtained by each institution. A
large majority of universities have quite similar average scores, while there is much larger
variation between fields of study within the same institution. To take just one example,
the University of Catanzaro obtained a maximum score of 0.87 and a minimum score of
0.2 , with an average score of 0.66. This makes clear the advantage of carrying out the
analysis at the subject-group level, since averaging enrolments and REE scores at the HEI
level would wash out most of the variation. The relatively low amount of variation in the
final VTR score is partly due to the design of the REE, as the number of products sent
for evaluation was quite low (one per every four researchers).20 Figure 2 presents the same
information as Figure 1 for the percentage of products that were evaluated as excellent in
each subject-group HEI. For this indicator, the variance is larger, with many subject-group
HEIs presenting no excellent products and some for which all research output presented
was judged as excellent.
By plotting the raw data, figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B visualise the kind of
empirical exercise undertaken in this paper. The figures plot the average number of stu-
dents enrolled per year in subject-group HEIs that obtained low (first quartile) versus high
19 For instance, a researcher in political economy (Economia Politica) can participate in a competition
for political economy or economic policy (Politica Economica).
20 This changed in subsequent REEs. Each university research staff member had to submit three research
products in the VQR 2004-2010 and two products in the VQR 2011-2014.
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(fourth quartile) scores and percentage of excellent products in the VTR. The number
of students enrolled per subject-group HEI decreased significantly in both groups during
2002-2011. However, the reduction was larger for subject-group HEIs that received a neg-
ative evaluation (i.e. with a score in the first quartile), and a large proportion of the
divergence occurred immediately after the publication of the results. Thus, the effect of
a better VTR rating on enrolment appears to be positive in the raw data. The falling
trend for the whole period is also evident for students graduating from high school with
a high mark,21, whereas for students from academic high schools, the initial decrease in
enrolment is compensated for by an increase between 2007 and 2011 for both high and low
VTR performing subject-group HEIs.
Sample descriptive statistics for some selected variables are reported in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
5 Results
5.1 Main results on student enrolment
The main results of our analysis are reported in Table 2, which consists of three panels.
In each panel, we use a different dependent variable. Panel A uses the number of total
enrolments, panel B uses the number of students enrolled who graduated from upper
secondary school with a high mark (90 or higher out of 100) and panel C, the number of
students enrolled coming from the academic track. In columns 1-3 we focus on the effect
of the VTR score and in columns 4-6, on the effect of the percentage of excellent products.
Table 2 about here
The baseline specification in column 1 controls for subject-group-HEI fixed effects and
separate province and year fixed effects. Column 1 demonstrates that total enrolments and
enrolments of high-mark students are positively associated with VTR score. A 1σ increase
in VTR score leads to a 3.7% increase in total enrolments and a 6.2% increase in the
enrolment of high-mark students. However, the association between total enrolments and
VTR score loses statistical significance when province-year (i.e. interaction) fixed effects
are included (column 2), while the coefficient for the enrolment of high-mark students is
not affected. All positive associations vanish in column 3, when subject-group-HEI linear
21 Since students in southern Italy have, on average, higher marks in the high school final examination
(see Montanaro, 2008), this trend may simply reflect a more sustained negative trend for HEIs located in
the South.
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trends are added, suggesting that they may partly be due to different subject-group-HEIs
being on different pre-VTR enrolment trends.
The results change markedly when we consider the proportion of excellent products.
Our baseline estimates show that a 1σ increase in the proportion of excellent products raises
total enrolments and enrolments of high-mark students by 5.8% and 8.7%, respectively.
These results are very robust to including province-year fixed effects as well as subject-
group-HEI linear trends (columns 5 and 6, respectively). In the most saturated specification
in column 6, a 1σ increase in the percentage of excellent products is expected to increase
total enrolments by 5.8%, enrolments of high-mark students by 8.3% and enrolments of
academic-track students by 12.2%.
To gain an idea of the magnitude of the effects, a 1σ increase in VTR score is equivalent
to a 0.1 increase in the score and corresponds to the difference in performance between
the economics subject group in Bocconi University, which scored 0.89 in the VTR and
ranked in first position (together with the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), and
the same subject group in universities such as Sassari, Siena or Bolzano (see Figure B3 in
Appendix B). Similarly, a 1σ increase in the proportion of excellent products is equivalent
to a 19 percentage point increase, which roughly corresponds to the difference between the
performance of economics at Bocconi University — with 50% of products deemed excellent
— and at the University of Bologna (see Figure B4 in Appendix B).
A possible explanation for the difference in results between columns 1-3 and 4-6 is that
the effect of the percentage of excellent products is capturing non-linear effects in the VTR
score. Indeed, although the two indicators are positively correlated, the correlation tends
to be higher for the top performing HEIs in terms of VTR score. This hypothesis is further
investigated in Section 5.3.
5.2 Non-parametric specification
Figure 3 about here
A possible concern with our identification strategy is that a high percentage of excellent
products in the VTR may pick up time-varying university reputation unrelated to the REE,
for which we are not able to control in the regressions. To test this hypothesis, we report
the estimates of a less parametric specification in which each pre- and post-VTR year
dichotomous indicator is interacted with the proportion of excellent products. This is
similar to what is commonly done in event-study analysis or to the strategy of including
leads and lags to detect anticipatory effects in difference-in-differences estimates. The
interaction with 2002 is omitted and represents the reference group. Ideally, the pre-VTR
interactions should be close to zero and statistically insignificant, and the interactions
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should be positive and statistically significant only in the post-VTR period if the REE
really did have an effect. This is what is observed in coefficients shown in Table C1
in Appendix C, which are plotted in Figure 3. Before 2005, the interactions are never
statistically significant and are close to zero. Moreover, the effect is quite constant over
time in the post-VTR period, confirming the adequacy of the linear specification in the
VTR results of equation (2).22
5.3 Non-linear effects
Section 5.1 shows that the percentage of excellent products seems to be much more salient
to attracting student enrolments than the VTR score. This is surprising, because the latter
was more likely to receive media attention (see our discussion in Section 6).
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the VTR score and the percentage of
excellent products is 0.88 in the fourth quartile of the VTR score and 0.63 in the lower
quartiles. In other words, a high percentage of excellent VTR products is a good proxy of
VTR score, especially for HEIs with high scores. Thus, we put forward that the difference
in the results between the two indicators may actually hide non-linear effects in the VTR
score. A similar result is reported in Chevalier and Jia (2016), who find that a better
ranking is associated with more applications, and the effect is stronger for institutions in
the top quantiles of the quality distribution.
Table 3 about here
Starting from this observation, we estimate a variant of equation (2) in which, in
addition to the interaction between VTR score and the post-2005 dichotomous variable,
we also add its interaction with a dichotomous variable for being placed in the fourth
quartile of the VTR score. In this specification, the non-interacted coefficient captures the
effect for the first three quartiles and the interacted coefficient (with Q4), the differential
effect for the fourth quartile. The results, reported in Table 3, point to larger effects for
HEIs in the top quartile. Focusing on column 3, for instance, VTR score appears to be
positively associated with total enrolments only for HEIs in the top quartile (a 13.9%
increase for a 1σ increase in VTR score). Similarly, the effect of VTR score on high-mark
and academic-track enrolments appears to be strongly positive only for HEIs in the fourth
quartile.
22 In these estimates, subject-group-HEI time trends are omitted because of multicollinearity.
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6 Discussion
This section provides a brief discussion of the potential channels through which the VTR
might have affected student choices. For new information to have had an impact on stu-
dents, they must have had access to it. To provide an idea of the diffusion of the VTR
results, we searched the historical archive of the Italian newspaper La Repubblica for the
phrase “Comitato di Indirizzo per la Valutazione della Ricerca” (Steering Committee for
Research Evaluation, CIVR), which is the committee that was in charge of managing the
VTR. We limited the search to 2006, i.e. the year when the VTR results were released.
The search delivered 13 results, 8 of which were related to the VTR (see Table D1 in Ap-
pendix D). Apart from one article that comments on the performance of the entire Italian
university system in general, all others are focused on specific universities and compare
their performance with other HEIs. The press coverage concerns institutions in northern
and central Italy (University of Turin, University of Bologna) and southern Italy (Univer-
sity of Palermo, University of Basilicata, University of Naples Federico II). The articles are
not limited to good performances in the VTR, but also cover cases of poor performance
(e.g. medicine at the University of Palermo). The press coverage of the VTR was therefore
fairly good. Even if not all universities were covered by articles in national newspapers,
we believe that readers (students and their parents) were made aware of the existence of a
national REE and of the university rankings produced by the CIVR, which were publicly
and freely available.
Figure D1 in Appendix D depicts the trend in internet searches for the abbreviation
“CIVR” in Italy (the term CIVR was mentioned in most press releases). A clear peak
in interest coincides with the publication of the VTR results and the appearance of the
first articles in the national press (February 2006). The public’s interest in the VTR is
also demonstrated by the high traffic and the large increase in the number of visits to
the website that published the VTR results (http://vtr2006.cineca.it/). Figure D2 in
Appendix D shows the trend in the number of visits.23 The website was visited 422,646
times in February 2006, with a monthly average of about 26,000 visits in the rest of the
year. Another peak in access is visible in February 2007 (136,025 visits), when the final
VTR report was published online. Apart from these two peaks, the amount of visits was
fairly constant over time, with a total number of 2,534,948 between January 2006 and
December 2011 — a monthly average of 30,178 visits.24
23 The website has been oﬄine since 2015, therefore the access statistics were retrieved from a backup
of the website provided by Internet Archive: Wayback Machine by running the search query: https:
//web.archive.org/web/20120701000000*/http://vtr2006.cineca.it/.
24 Although people working in the higher education sector may account for a non-negligible number of
visits in February 2006 and February 2007, this is less likely to be the case in other periods. Indeed, the
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One possible reading of our results might be that the HEIs that performed well in the
VTR made a more intense use of the media to attract students, or that they used some of
the funds they received because of their good VTR results to increase advertising. Both
actions may be considered as induced by the combination of a good performance in the VTR
and higher investment in informational campaigns. In short, they can still be considered
as an effect of the VTR. Unfortunately, data regarding the advertising expenditures of
HEIs are not available however we conducted an indirect test of this hypothesis using
the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) Survey of Secondary School Graduates
(Indagine sui percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati). Specifically, we used the 2007
and 2011 surveys, which refer to secondary school students graduating in 2004 and 2007,
respectively. Students who enrolled in higher education before the 2006-2007 academic
year are considered untreated, and those enrolled in the 2006-2007 academic year or later
are considered as treated by the VTR. In addition to some background information on the
students and their families, the survey provides information on the main channels through
which students collected information about universities. The possible answers (leaflets
and specialised guides, orientation in secondary school, orientation at university, internet,
family and friends, the press, other) were recoded to build a dichotomous indicator for
having used the internet or the press, i.e. the means that are more likely to be targeted by
informational campaigns related to the VTR. If HEIs that performed better in the VTR
focused more on advertising, we should observe students being more likely to have used
either the internet or the press in universities with a higher VTR score.
We selected the estimation sample in order to include only students who were currently
enrolled in a first-level degree or who had already completed a first-level degree and were
not currently enrolled in higher education. Thus, we can be sure that the answer to the
question above refers to first-level degrees. Moreover, in order to make the two surveys
comparable, we dropped from the 2011 survey any student who enrolled in higher education
in 2011 (26 students), i.e. four years since their high school graduation, mainly because in
the first wave, students were interviewed three years from graduation. The survey provides
the alma mater and the subject group, to which VTR data can be merged. We estimated
linear probability models regressing the probability of having used the press or the internet
to collect information about universities on the VTR results, and a set of control variables.
In all regressions, we included: student age group at the time of the survey, gender, father’s
education, mother’s education, secondary school region, secondary school track (here we
consider more finely defined tracks, namely vocational, technical, academic, pedagogical,
artistic), secondary school final mark, year of enrolment in higher education and survey
website was designed solely for the publishing of the VTR results and was not subjected to important
updates over time.
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year. We then added fixed effects in an incremental way: subject-group fixed effects,
subject-group and HEI fixed effects, and subject-group-HEI fixed effects. The sample
with non-missing dependent and control variables includes 15,702 observations. Sample
descriptive statistics are reported in Table E1 in Appendix E. The estimation results are
shown in Table E2 in Appendix E, which includes four columns corresponding to the four
sets of fixed effects included. The table shows a statistically significant correlation at
the 10% level only in panel A, in the model including subject-group fixed effects (column
1). However, when we compare “like with like”, i.e. students enrolled in the same alma
mater or in the same alma mater and subject group before and after the VTR (columns
2 and 3, respectively), the coefficient on the VTR score falls in magnitude and becomes
statistically insignificant. Panel B, where an interaction term between the treatment and
the top quartile of the VTR score is included, shows similar results. Thus, this indirect
test offers no supporting evidence that the increase in the number of student enrolments in
the HEIs that performed well in the VTR was mainly driven by an increase in advertising.
One might wonder if the information provided by the VTR was indeed new, or if it
simply provided similar information to what was already available to students through
rankings produced by newspapers.25 Although this possibility seems to be excluded by
the results of Section 5.2, to further test this hypothesis, we used information from the
Censis-Repubblica University Guides, which build rankings at the subject-group level. We
gathered a dataset from the paper editions of the annual guides, covering the whole period
of our analysis. The guides provide different indicators and rankings, and we focus here on
the final score,26 which was used by Censis-Repubblica to compile the rankings of subject-
group HEIs. This indicator is included as an additional covariate in the different models,
and the results are reported in Table F1 in Appendix F. The estimates on VTR score
and the percentage of excellent products turn out to be very robust to the inclusion of
the Censis-Repubblica quality indicator and very close to those reported in Table 2. This
suggests that the VTR had an additional effect over and above the league tables already
available to the public. The effect of the Censis-Repubblica score is positive and statistically
significant in some models, especially in those omitting subject-group-HEI trends.
25 Pigini and Staffolani (2016), for instance, use a cross-section of Italian secondary school graduates to
show that more talented students’ enrolment decisions are affected by university quality — proxied by the
Censis-Repubblica scores — irrespective of family socio-economic status.
26 The final score is constructed as the average of standardised scores in four areas: productivity, teaching,
research and internationalisation.
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7 Additional results
In this section, we provide additional results on other effects of the REEs on students. In
particular, in Section 7.1, we extend the analysis to the second REE (VQR 2004-2010).
7.1 Effect of the first and second REEs on student enrolment
Although in our main analysis, we studied the effect of introducing an REE on student
enrolment decisions, one may also be interested to know the gains in student enrolments
that a HEI can achieve by improving its performance in the REEs. We limit the analysis
to the first two REEs, i.e. the VTR and the VQR 2004-2010 (VQR1, hereafter), the results
of which were publicly released in September 2013. Since results of the latest REE (VQR
2011-2014) were published in January 2017, there is not enough post-REE data to analyse
its effects. The estimated equation reads as
lnYijt = β0 +
∑
i
β1iDi +
∑
j
∑
t
β2jtDjt + β3REEijt + ijt (4)
where lnYijt is the logarithm of student enrolments, Di are subject-group-HEI fixed
effects and Djt are province-year fixed effects (in some specifications, we use separate
province and year fixed effects). REEijt is the result of either the VTR or the VQR1 in
the subject-group-HEI, standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Since
the VQR1 results were published in September 2013, the first academic year affected by
this REE is 2013/2014. Thus, REEijt contains the values of the VTR before 2013 and the
values of the VQR1 after 2012. Data on student enrolments after 2013 were taken from the
new version of MIUR’s Statistical Office website and are publicly available.27 However,
the time series starts from the 2014/15 academic year, so we have a break in the data
(i.e. the 2012/13 and 2013/14 academic years are missing). Thus, we run the regression
(4) on the pooled sample including the academic years of 2006/07-2011/12 (6 years) and
2014/15-2016/17 (3 years).
This specification estimates a different parameter from that identified in Section 3. In-
deed, while in Section 3 we focus on the first REE and estimate the effect of introducing an
REE, in this section, we estimate the effect of improving a HEI’s performance in the REE.
For a number of reasons, we expect these two situations to differ. First, the introduction
of an REE probably offers an informational content larger than the simple improvement
of performance in the REE, especially when information on university quality is scarce.
27http://dati.ustat.miur.it/organization/ace58834-5a0b-40f6-9b0e-ed6c34ea8de0?tags=
Universit%C3%A0&tags=Studenti. Data on type of upper secondary school and upper secondary
school final exam marks have not been released. The old version of the MIUR Statistical Office’s website
reported enrolment data only until the 2011/2012 academic year.
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Second, and more importantly, there is little that HEIs could have done to improve their
performance in the first REE because it was based on past research, in a period in which
scholars did not expect a REE. By contrast, after the VTR, HEIs began to better under-
stand how the REEs function and adopted policies to improve their performance. Thus, a
change in score between the two REEs can hardly be seen as “exogenous”.
Table 4 about here
Despite these caveats, the estimation of equation (4) reported in Table 4 can still be
informative. Column 1 (panel A) reports the results of the specification including separate
province and year fixed effects and subject-group-HEI fixed effects. Interestingly, a 1σ
increase in the REE score is associated with a 7.1% rise in student enrolment (statistically
significant at the 5% level). The coefficient is smaller when province-year fixed effects are
included (column 2, panel A), falling to 4.3% and losing statistical significance.
In panel B, we report the estimates including an interaction term between REE per-
formance and Q4 (i.e. being placed in the fourth quartile of the REE indicator, where the
quartiles are REE-specific). Quite interestingly, the results show that HEIs in Q1-Q3 gain
more enrolments from improving their performance, compared to the HEIs in the top quar-
tile, for which there is a negative gradient for the REE score. This is an interesting finding
that deserves further analysis. If confirmed by the post-VQR 2011-2014 data, this evidence
may suggest that research-intensive universities are changing their development strategies,
switching from a model of expansion based on increasing student numbers, which was the
main method of obtaining new public resources in the past, to a model based on student
quality and research excellence, e.g. by increasing selective entry mechanisms at the un-
dergraduate level (i.e. courses with a planned number of students, numero programmato).
This may have been partly induced by the gradual increase in the share of resources al-
located by the government according to REEs. Indeed, Law no. 98 of 9 August 2013
provides for a gradual increase, reaching 30% of total public funding at “full regime”, of
which 3/5 must be allocated according the most recent REE results. Similar effects of a
good performance in rankings on HEI selectivity are indeed observed in other countries
(Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999; Meredith, 2004).
8 Concluding remarks
This paper focuses on the first Italian REE (the VTR), which was completed in 2006. It
features the first assessment of the VTR’s impact on student decisions, namely on the total
number of university enrolments and on the enrolment of high-quality students, proxied by
high school final examination marks and graduation from the academic high school track.
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To the best of our knowledge, our paper also represents the first study investigating the
effect of establishing an REE on student enrolment decisions.
We relate the number of student enrolments at the subject-group-HEI level to VTR
ratings using a “differential intensity” before-after estimator. In particular, we investi-
gate whether subject-group HEIs with a better VTR performance in 2006 also had better
student enrolment outcomes after 2006.
Our analysis for the period 2002-2011 shows that the final VTR score had an effect on
the number and quality of students enrolled, but that the effect was differentiated across
the score distribution. Indeed, in our preferred specification (including subject-group-HEI
and province-year fixed effects), a 1σ increase in VTR score (i.e. 0.1 points on the VTR
scale, which ranges from 0.2 to 1) leads to a 13.9% increase in total enrolments, but only
for HEIs in the first quartile of the score. In these HEIs, a 1σ increase in VTR score also
leads to a 24.4% increase in the enrolment of students graduating from upper secondary
school with a high mark (at least 90 out of 100) and a 33% increase in students coming
from the academic high school track,. In contrast, an increase in VTR score does not
translate into similar gains in enrolment for HEIs in lower quartiles. This last result points
to the potentially inequality-enhancing effects of REEs, which might further increase the
enrolment gaps between top-ranked and lower-performing HEIs.
The positive effect of the VTR on student enrolment and student quality may be
explained by student access to new information about the “quality” of universities, as shown
by the high volume of traffic on the website that published the VTR results, especially at
the time of the first press coverage of the VTR (February 2006). Investigating potential
mechanisms, we find that the increase in student enrolments does not seem to be driven
by an increase in advertising activities by HEIs however, and that the VTR appears to
have an information content over and above rankings already available to students. Since a
similar evaluation of university teaching was not in place during the same period, a possible
reading of our results is that, in the absence of reliable information on teaching quality,
students were using research performance in the REE as a proxy for teaching quality.
Further exploratory analyses using data from both the first and second REEs (i.e. VTR
and VQR 2004-2010) show that there were enrolment gains associated with an improved
performance on the REE, but that the top-performing institutions did not benefit from
this. Indeed, top-ranked institutions (in terms of research) show a negative enrolment
gradient in the REE scores when the analysis focuses on the 2006-2016 period. We put
forward that the top research institutions might have increased their level of selectivity,
possibly reducing student numbers in an attempt to maintain their focus on research and
increase their share of public funding allocated according to research performance in the
most recent REEs. Such a hypothesis would deserve further investigation.
20
Acknowledgements. We gratefully acknowledge comments received from two anony-
mous reviewers and participants at the Third Workshop on Education Economics (Leuven),
the Eighth International Workshop on Applied Economics of Education (IWAEE, Catan-
zaro), the XIII Workshop on Economics of Education (IEB, Barcelona) — in particular
from the discussant Mika Kortelainen — the XXXII National Conference of Labour Eco-
nomics (Cosenza), as well as colleagues from the University of Milan, the National Agency
for the Evaluation of the University System (ANVUR) and IRVAPP (Trento). The scien-
tific output reported and views expressed in this paper do not imply a policy position of
the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on
behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication.
The usual disclaimers apply.
References
Auranen, O. and M. Nieminen (2010). University research funding and publication perfor-
mance — An international comparison. Research Policy 39 (6), 822–834.
Bowman, N. A. and M. N. Bastedo (2009). Getting on the front page: Organizational
reputation, status signals, and the impact of U.S. News and World Report on student
decisions. Research in Higher Education 50 (5), 415–436.
Bratti, M., D. Checchi, and G. de Blasio (2008). Does the expansion of Higher Education in-
crease the equality of educational opportunities? Evidence from Italy. LABOUR 22 (s1),
53–88.
Broecke, S. (2015). University rankings: Do they matter in the UK? Education Eco-
nomics 23 (2), 137–161.
Cappellari, L. and C. Lucifora (2009). The “Bologna Process” and college enrollment
decisions. Labour Economics 16 (6), 638–647.
Cattaneo, M., M. Meoli, and A. Signori (2016). Performance-based funding and university
research productivity: The moderating effect of university legitimacy. The Journal of
Technology Transfer 41 (1), 85–104.
Checchi, D., A. Ichino, and A. Rustichini (1999). More equal but less mobile?: Educa-
tion financing and intergenerational mobility in Italy and in the US. Journal of Public
Economics 74 (3), 351–393.
Chevalier, A. and X. Jia (2016). Subject-specific league tables and students’ application
decisions. Manchester School 84 (5), 600–620.
21
Ciriaci, D. (2014). Does university quality influence the interregional mobility of students
and graduates? The case of Italy. Regional Studies 48 (10), 1592–1608.
Correia, S. (2015). Singletons, cluster-robust standard errors and fixed effects: A bad mix.
mimeo, Duke University.
Di Pietro, G. and A. Cutillo (2008). Degree flexibility and university drop-out: The Italian
experience. Economics of Education Review 27 (5), 546–555.
Duflo, E. (2001). Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in indone-
sia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment. American Economic Review 91 (4),
795–813.
Fischer, M. and P. Kampko¨tter (2017). Effects of German Universities’ Excellence Ini-
tiative on ability sorting of students and perceptions of educational quality. Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 173 (4), 662–687.
Franceschet, M. and A. Costantini (2011). The first Italian research assessment exercise:
A bibliometric perspective. Journal of Informetrics 5 (2), 275 – 291.
Geuna, A. and M. Piolatto (2016). Research assessment in the UK and Italy: Costly and
difficult, but probably worth it (at least for a while). Research Policy 45 (1), 260–271.
Gibbons, S., E. Neumayer, and R. Perkins (2015). Student satisfaction, league tables and
university applications: Evidence from Britain. Economics of Education Review 48 (C),
148–164.
Griffith, A. and K. Rask (2007). The influence of the U.S. News and World Report collegiate
rankings on the matriculation decision of high-ability students: 1995-2004. Economics
of Education Review 26 (2), 244–255.
Horstschra¨er, J. (2012). University rankings in action? The importance of rankings and
an excellence competition for university choice of high-ability students. Economics of
Education Review 31 (6), 1162–1176.
Jime´nez-Contreras, E., F. de Moya Anego´n, and E. D. Lo´pez-Co´zar (2003). The evolution
of research activity in Spain: The impact of the National Commission for the Evaluation
of Research Activity (CNEAI). Research Policy 32 (1), 123–142.
Luca, M. and S. Jonathan (2013). Salience in quality disclosure: Evidence from the U.S.
News College Rankings. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 22 (1), 58–77.
22
Meredith, M. (2004). Why do universities compete in the ratings game? An empirical
analysis of the effects of the U.S. News and World Report College Rankings. Research
in Higher Education 45 (5), 443–461.
Monks, J. and R. G. Ehrenberg (1999). U.S. News and World Report’s College Rankings:
Why do they matter. Change 31 (6), 42–51.
Montanaro, P. (2008). I divari territoriali nella preparazione degli studenti italiani: Evi-
denze dalle indagini nazionali e internazionali. Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Oc-
casional papers), Bank of Italy, n. 14.
Niklasson, L. (1996). Quasi-markets in higher education–a comparative analysis. Journal
of Higher Education Policy and Management 18 (1), 7–22.
Oppedisano, V. (2011). The (adverse) effects of expanding higher education: Evidence
from Italy. Economics of Education Review 30 (5), 997–1008.
Pigini, C. and S. Staffolani (2016). Beyond participation: Do the cost and quality of higher
education shape the enrollment composition? The case of Italy. Higher Education 71 (1),
119–142.
Rebora, G. and M. Turri (2013). The UK and Italian research assessment exercises face to
face. Research Policy 42 (9), 1657–1666.
Sauder, M. and R. Lancaster (2006). Do rankings matter? The effects of U.S. News
& World Report rankings on the admissions process of law schools. Law & Society
Review 40 (1), 105–134.
Soo, K. T. (2013). Does anyone use information from university rankings? Education
Economics 21 (2), 176–190.
Sylos Labini, M. and N. Zinovyeva (2011). Stimulating graduates’ research-oriented careers:
Does academic research matter? Industrial and Corporate Change 20 (1), 337–365.
Tutterow, C. and J. A. Evans (2016). Reconciling the small effect of rankings on university
performance with the transformational cost of conformity. In E. P. Berman and C. Pa-
radeise (Eds.), The University Under Pressure, Volume 46 of Research in the Sociology
of Organizations, pp. 265–301. Emerald.
23
Figure 1: VTR final score by university
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Note. The figure plots the maximum, the minimum and the mean of the VTR score by HEI. Each value
refers to a different subject group.
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Figure 2: Percentage of excellent VTR products by university
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Note. The figure plots the maximum, the minimum and the mean of the percentage of excellent VTR
products by HEI. Each value refers to a different subject group.
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Figure 3: Coefficients and confidence intervals for the proportion of excellent products
interacted with year dummies
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Note. This picture shows the coefficients on the interaction terms between proportion of excellent products
and year dummies estimated in Table C1. The interaction with 2002 represents the reference group. The
first, second and third graphs refer to regressions using total enrolment, enrolment of high-mark students
and enrolment of students from academic high school track as dependent variables, respectively.
26
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Std.Dev.
VTR score 0.775 0.103
% excellent products 28.01 18.98
Enrolment
2002 395.76 512.59
2003 395.95 513.10
2004 377.11 484.67
2005 367.72 470.04
2006 316.90 420.46
2007 318.56 423.11
2008 306.90 408.31
2009 306.63 403.73
2010 308.92 403.76
2011 310.11 414.98
Note. This table reports some descriptive statistics for some selected variables used in our analysis. Enrol-
ments are the average number of undegraduate students enrolled at the subject-group-HEI level.
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Table 2: Effect of VTR on total (log) students enrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables VTR score % Excellent products
Panel A. Total enrolment
VTR · Post2005 0.037* 0.024 0.014 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.058**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Number of observations 7350 7302 7302 7350 7302 7302
R2 0.822 0.840 0.887 0.822 0.841 0.887
Panel B. High-mark enrolment
VTR · Post2005 0.062** 0.065** -0.005 0.087*** 0.102*** 0.083**
(0.026) (0.031) (0.042) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036)
Number of observations 7302 7254 7254 7302 7254 7254
R2 0.745 0.778 0.835 0.745 0.779 0.835
Panel C. Academic-track enrolment
VTR · Post2005 0.003 0.012 0.030 0.042 0.074** 0.122***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.039) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038)
Number of observations 7302 7254 7254 7302 7254 7254
R2 0.727 0.801 0.854 0.727 0.801 0.855
control variables (all panels):
Subject-group-HEI FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Province-year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Subject-group-HEI linear time trends No No Yes No No Yes
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the subject-
group-HEI level.
Note. Panel A, B and C refer to models using as dependent variables the logarithm of total undegraduate
enrolments, of high-mark enrolments and of academic-track enrolments, respectively. In columns 1-3 the
VTR variable listed in the first column (“Variables”) is the VTR score and in columns 4-6 is the % of
excellent research products. The number of observations differs across panels because some HEIs did not
provide data on the number of student enrolments by secondary school final mark and secondary school
track. Moreover, the number of observations differs across columns because singleton groups (defined by
the combination of fixed effects) are dropped in the estimation. This is done as retaining singletons may
overstate statistical significance and lead to incorrect inference (Correia, 2015).
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Table 3: Effect of VTR on total (log) students enrolled by quartile of VTR score
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total enrolment
VTR score · Post2005 -0.004 -0.039 -0.034
(0.025) (0.030) (0.031)
VTR score · Post2005 · Q4 0.158** 0.230*** 0.173**
(0.069) (0.077) (0.074)
Number of observations 7350 7302 7302
R2 0.823 0.841 0.887
Panel B. High-mark enrolment
VTR score · Post2005 0.018 -0.000 -0.099*
(0.033) (0.040) (0.054)
VTR score · Post2005 · Q4 0.169* 0.239** 0.343***
(0.096) (0.102) (0.108)
Number of observations 7302 7254 7254
R2 0.745 0.779 0.835
Panel C. Academic-track enrolment
VTR score · Post2005 -0.041 -0.065 -0.084*
(0.036) (0.041) (0.050)
VTR score · Post2005 · Q4 0.167* 0.284*** 0.414***
(0.098) (0.106) (0.111)
Number of observations 7302 7254 7254
R2 0.727 0.801 0.855
control variables (all panels):
Subject-group-HEI FE Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes No No
Province-year FE No Yes Yes
Subject-group-HEI linear time trends No No Yes
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the subject-
group-HEI level.
Note. Panel A, B and C refer to models using as dependent variables the logarithm of total undegraduate
enrolments, of high-mark enrolments and of academic-track enrolments, respectively. Q4 is a dichotomous
indicator for the fourth quartile of the VTR score (lower quartiles are the reference group). The number of
observations differs across panels because some HEIs did not provide data on the number of student enrol-
ments by secondary school final mark and secondary school track. Moreover, the number of observations
differs across columns because singleton groups (defined by the combination of fixed effects) are dropped
in the estimation.
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Table 4: Effect of VTR and VQR 2004-2010 results on (log) enrolments
Variables (1) (2)
Panel A. Baseline
REE score 0.071** 0.043
(0.030) (0.027)
Number of observations 6342 6272
R2 0.844 0.865
Panel B. With Q4 interaction
REE score 0.092*** 0.066***
(0.029) (0.027)
REE score · Q4 -0.127*** -0.137***
(0.046) (0.044)
Number of observations 6342 6272
R2 0.844 0.866
control variables (all panels)
Subject-group-HEI FE Yes Yes
Province FE Yes No
Year FE Yes No
Province-year FE No Yes
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the subject-
group-HEI level.
Note. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total undegraduate student enrolments. The estimation
refers to the pooled 2006-2011 and 2014-2016 periods. REE variables refer to the VTR (results published
in 2006) in the subperiod 2006-2011 and to the VQR 2004-2010 (results published in 2013) in the subperiod
2014-2016. Q4 is a dichotomous indicator for the fourth quartile of the REE score (lower quartiles are the
reference group). The number of observations differs across columns because singleton groups (defined by
the combination of fixed effects) are dropped in the estimation.
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Appendix
A Mapping of research to teaching subject groups
Table A1: Mapping of VTR to teaching subject groups
Identifiers Disciplinary areas (VTR) Teaching subject groups
1 1+2 Hard sciences (maths and physics)
2 3 Chemistry
3 4+5+15e Biology
4 6 Medicine
5 7+15b Agriculture
6 8 Architecture
7 9+15c+15d Engineering
8 10+15f Humanities
9 11 Teaching and psychology
10 12 Law
11 13 Economics and Statistics
12 14+15a Political and Social sciences
Note. In the first column, we show the identifiers of the 12 areas that we use in the analysis. They result
from merging the disciplinary areas in the VTR (second column) and the fields of study as classified by
the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) for teaching purposes (third column). The
disciplinary areas in the VTR are the 14 CUN areas (1 - Mathematics and Computer Sciences, 2 - Physics,
3 - Chemistry, 4 - Earth Sciences, 5 - Biology, 6 - Medicine, 7 - Agriculture and Veterinary, 8 - Civil
Engineering and Architecture, 9 - Industrial and Information Engineering, 10 - Humanities, 11 - Teaching
and Psychology, 12 - Law, 13 - Economics and Statistics and 14 - Political and Social Sciences) plus 6
inter-disciplinary areas (15a - Science of information and communication, 15b - Science for food quality
and safety, 15c - Science for nano-microsystems, 15d - Aerospace sciences, 15e - Science for sustainable
development and governance, and 15f - Science for the evaluation and enhancement of cultural heritage).
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B Additional figures
Figure B1: Average number of students enrolled by year for first (Q1) and fourth (Q4)
quartiles of VTR score
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Note. The vertical line is drawn for the last academic year (2005/2006) that was not affected by the VTR.
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Figure B2: Average number of students enrolled by year for first (Q1) and fourth (Q4)
quartiles of % excellent products
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Note. The vertical line is drawn for the last academic year (2005/2006) that was not affected by the VTR.
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Figure B3: VTR final score for the economics subject group by HEI
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Figure B4: Proportion of excellent products by economics subject-group HEI
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C Non-parametric specification
Table C1: Effect of VTR percentage of excellent products on student enrolment outcomes
Variables Total enrolment High-mark Academic-track
(1) (2) (3)
% of VTR excellent products · 2003 0.018 0.024 0.052*
(0.016) (0.030) (0.031)
% of VTR excellent products · 2004 -0.003 -0.017 -0.019
(0.018) (0.035) (0.035)
% of VTR excellent products · 2005 0.010 -0.012 0.013
(0.021) (0.040) (0.036)
% of VTR excellent products · 2006 0.062** 0.092** 0.113**
(0.027) (0.045) (0.045)
% of VTR excellent products · 2007 0.074** 0.080* 0.107**
(0.030) (0.048) (0.047)
% of VTR excellent products · 2008 0.058* 0.084* 0.087**
(0.030) (0.049) (0.044)
% of VTR excellent products · 2009 0.071** 0.113** 0.076*
(0.031) (0.045) (0.045)
% of VTR excellent products · 2010 0.076** 0.119** 0.067
(0.033) (0.051) (0.049)
% of VTR excellent products · 2011 0.069* 0.121** 0.061
(0.035) (0.053) (0.050)
Number of observations 7302 7254 7254
R2 0.841 0.779 0.801
control variables:
Subject-group-HEI FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-year FE Yes Yes Yes
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the subject-
group-HEI level.
Note. Columns 1-3 report coefficients on the percentage of excellent products by year interactions for
the three regressions using (log) total undergraduate enrolments, (log) high-mark enrolments and (log)
academic-track enrolments, respectively, as dependent variables. The interaction with 2002 is omitted and
is the reference group.
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D VTR media coverage
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Figure D1: Trend in internet searches for the abbreviation “CIVR”
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Note. Trend in internet searches for the “CIVR”, i.e. the abbreviation for the Italian term Steering
Committee for Research Evaluation (Comitato di Indirizzo per la Valutazione della Ricerca). The maximum
number is normalised to 100.
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Figure D2: Number of visits to the website that published the VTR results
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Note. Since the website that published the results (http://vtr2006.cineca.it/) is oﬄine since 2015, the
access statistics were retrieved from the backup of the website provided by Internet Archive: Wayback
Machine running the search query: https://web.archive.org/web/20120701000000*/http://vtr2006.
cineca.it/.
41
42
E Probability of using the internet or the press to collect
information about universities
Table E1: Sample descriptive statistics
Variables N. obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variable:
Used internet or press to collect information 15,702 0.38
Control variables:
VTR score 15,702 0.39 0.40
% Excellent products 15,702 15.08 19.82
Female 15,702 0.62
Age group (ref. 25 or more)
24 15,702 0.06
23 15,702 0.44
less than 23 15,702 0.46
Father education (ref. no education/primary)
lower secondary 15,702 0.35
upper secondary 15,702 0.45
tertiary 15,702 0.13
Mother education (ref. no education/primary)
lower secondary 15,702 0.33
upper secondary 15,702 0.48
tertiary 15,702 0.12
Secondary school track (ref. academic)
vocational 15,702 0.12
technical 15,702 0.30
pedagogical 15,702 0.19
artistic 15,702 0.07
Secondary school final exam marks 15,702 80.88 12.41
Years of enrolment in higher education (ref. 2004)
2005 15,702 0.06
2006 15,702 0.02
2007 15,702 0.41
2008 15,702 0.05
2009 15,702 0.02
2010 15,702 0.01
Note. Sample descriptive statistics refer to the sample selected from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the ISTAT
Survey of Secondary School Graduates according to the rules described in Section 6. Standard deviations
(Std. Dev.) are not reported for dichotomous variables. Mother’s and father’s education refer to when the
student was 14 years old. Reference categories for categorical variables are reported in brackets. For the
sake of space the table does not report the fixed effects for the subject-group, alma maters, survey waves
and the region of the secondary school.
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Table E2: Probability of using the internet or the press to collect information about uni-
versities
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Panel A.
VTR score · Post2005 0.012* 0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Number of observations 15702 15701 15673
Panel B.
VTR score · Post2005 0.008 0.002 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
VTR score · Post2005 · Q4 0.013 0.009 -0.004
(0.019) (0.017) (0.022)
Number of observations 15702 15701 15673
Fixed effects (all panels)
Subject-group Yes Yes No
HEI No Yes No
Subject-group-HEI No No Yes
Region of school Yes Yes Yes
Survey year Yes Yes Yes
Year of enrolment Yes Yes Yes
*, ** statistically significant at the 10 and 5% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the subject-group-HEI
level.
Note. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for using the internet or the press as the main
sources of information on universities, for the students who enrolled in first-level degrees. The model is
estimated with OLS (i.e. linear probability model). Q4 is a dichotomous indicator for the fourth quartile
of the VTR score. The individual level data come from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the ISTAT Survey of
Secondary School Graduates. All regressions also include controls for: student age group at the time of
the survey (25 or more, 24, 23, less than 23), gender, father education, mother education, secondary school
track (vocational, technical, academic, pedagogical, artistic) and the secondary school final exam marks.
The number of observations differs across columns because singletons (defined by the combination of fixed
effects) are dropped from the estimation.
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F Models controlling for Censis-Repubblica university rank-
ing
Table F1: Effect of VTR on (log) enrolment of students including Censis-Repubblica score
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VTR score % Excellent products
Panel A. Total enrolment
Censis-Repubblica score 0.060** 0.059** 0.012 0.059** 0.058** 0.010
(0.025) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.023)
VTR · Post2005 0.033* 0.023 0.014 0.056** 0.062** 0.060**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030) (0.023)
Number of observations 7350 7302 7302 7350 7302 7302
R2 0.824 0.841 0.886 0.824 0.842 0.887
Panel B. High-mark enrolment
Censis-Repubblica score 0.064* 0.060 0.023 0.062* 0.060 0.019
(0.035) (0.039) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.033)
VTR · Post2005 0.059** 0.064** -0.005 0.085*** 0.102*** 0.085**
(0.026) (0.031) (0.042) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036)
Number of observations 7302 7254 7254 7302 7254 7254
R2 0.747 0.780 0.835 0.747 0.780 0.835
Panel C. Academic-track enrolment
Censis-Repubblica score 0.054 0.081** 0.031 0.049 0.080** 0.028
(0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033)
VTR · Post2005 0.000 0.011 0.028 0.041 0.074** 0.124***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.040) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038)
Number of observations 7302 7254 7254 7302 7254 7254
R2 0.729 0.802 0.855 0.729 0.803 0.855
control variables (all panels):
Subject-group-HEI FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Province-year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Subject-group-HEI linear time trends No No Yes No No Yes
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the subject-
group-HEI level.
Note. Panel A, B and C refer to models using as dependent variables the logarithm of total enrolments,
of high-mark enrolments and of academic-track enrolments, respectively. In columns 1-3 the VTR variable
listed in the first column (“Variables”) is the VTR score and in columns 4-6 is the % of excellent research
products. The number of observations differs across panels because some HEIs did not provide data on
the number of student enrolments by secondary school final mark and secondary school track. Moreover,
the number of observations differs across columns because singleton groups (defined by the combination of
fixed effects) are dropped in the estimation.
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